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NOTES AND COMMENTS
SERVICE (NOW) SOLD SEPARATELY: THE
SUPREME COURT EXPANDS THE PER SE
PROHIBITION OF TYING
ARRANGEMENTS IN EASTMAN
KODAK CO. v. IMAGE TECHNICAL SERVICES
I. INTRODUCTION
The history of American antitrust regulation has long been charac-
terized by frequent, fundamental changes in policy and extensive, heated
debate.I The law governing the proper treatment of tying arrangements
2
has always been a shining example of this debate.' Underlying the tying
arrangement dispute are two opposing views of why tying arrangements
should be prohibited. The first view asserts that the only valid purpose
for prohibiting tying is the promotion of economic efficiency. The second
view insists that an additional reason for the prohibition is the promotion
of economic health by preventing the centralization of economic power,
so that competitor protection is also a valid antitrust policy goal in some
situations.
In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.,' the
Supreme Court reentered the antitrust fray by considering the issue of
whether a seller's total lack of market power in an equipment market
1. For a thorough discussion of this history as it pertains to tying arrangements see Victor H.
Kramer, The Supreme Court and Tying Arrangements: Antitrust as History, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1013,
1013 (1985) (asserting that the dispute over the proper application of the antitrust laws "rivals some
of the debates about the world's great religions"). Cf. DONALD E. WALDMAN, THE EcONOMIcs OF
ANTITRUST 17 (1986) (analyzing the conflicting interests that are involved in the antitrust arena).
2. A tying arrangement is a "condition imposed by a seller or lessor so that a buyer or lessee
may obtain a desired product (the 'tying' product) only if it also agrees to take an additional product
(the 'tied' product), which may or may not be desired." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1519 (6th ed.
1990).
3. Kramer, supra note 1, at 1018 n.24 (noting that "[tioday, a unanimous decision could well
evoke more surprised comment than would a seriously divided opinion").
4. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
1
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necessarily precludes the possibility of unlawful and economically harm-
ful behavior in the parts and service aftermarkets for that equipment.5 A
group of independent service organizations (ISOs) challenged Eastman
Kodak's sales practices that linked the sale of Kodak replacement parts
to the sale of Kodak services.6 The ISOs claimed that Kodak's practices
constituted an illegal tying arrangement and a monopolization of a rele-
vant market in violation of both sections of the Sherman Act.' Kodak
responded with an argument premised on strict economic theory and on
the view that the only valid purpose of the antitrust laws is consumer
protection. It argued that since it lacked power in the equipment market,
as a matter of law, it could not force an anticompetitive tie in the equip-
ment's aftermarkets. In other words, it asserted that interbrand competi-
tion for its equipment would spill over to the equipment's aftermarkets,
thus preventing any harm to consumers. On this basis, the District
Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment
for Kodak after truncated discovery.'
However, a majority of the Supreme Court reversed the District
Court by accepting the plausibility of alternative theories that were also
founded on an economic analysis and that, at least nominally, focused on
consumer protection. Specifically, the Court speculated that previously
unrecognized market imperfections-information and switching costs-
could prevent the primary and derivative markets from interacting as
Kodak asserted. Thus, the Kodak majority concluded that it was possi-
ble that unlawful tying and monopolization had occurred. In so doing,
the Court laid the groundwork for prohibiting many tying arrangements
which were previously considered harmless, particularly in the markets
for high-technology equipment.
This note will explain the Court's analysis, point out potential con-
flicts that the opinion could create, and examine underlying policy-based
judgments that were at play in the Court's resolution of the case. The
5. A derivative aftermarket is simply a market that is created by the need for support and
maintenance of a good sold in a primary market. For example, the primary market for automobiles
leads to the creation of the derivative aftermarkets for automobile maintenance and parts.
6. See infra part III.A.
7. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988) ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared illegal.").
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988) ("Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monop-
olize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony
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conclusions that are reached are two-fold. First, the economic theories
upon which the Court bases its decision are not completely sound. Sec-
ond, despite the Court's focus on consumer protection and economic the-
ory throughout its analysis, the resolution of the case is also based on an
unexpressed policy judgment of promoting marketplace diversity by pro-
tecting competitors.
II. BACKGROUND
To understand the Court's resolution of Kodak, the case must be
seen in the context of the pre-existing law. This requires a brief discus-
sion of two topics: (1) the debate over why tying should be prohibited
and the law that accompanies that debate; and (2) the Jefferson Parish
decision, which attempted to settle the law of tying prior to Kodak.
A. The Debate Over Tying Arrangements-Theory and Practice
Despite the existence of legislation that prohibits tying arrange-
ments, they are only illegal in narrow circumstances, and it is generally
agreed that tying is not per se harmful. In fact, the Supreme Court has
consistently adopted the view that tying arrangements should only be
illegal per se where the seller has the power to force a tie onto unwilling
consumers.9 The Court adopted this view in recognition of the fact that
absent some forcing power a consumer can avoid unwanted ties by buy-
ing the tying good elsewhere.10
In recent years, however, there has been a great deal of controversy
regarding exactly what conditions give a seller the ability to force a tie in
an economically harmful manner. The primary source of this contro-
versy is a basic disagreement as to the purpose for prohibiting tying. Ac-
cording to one view, the law of tying should seek to promote a diverse
marketplace by preventing the use of ties to agglomerate economic
power. Under this view, consumers should obviously be protected from
being forced to accept an unwanted tie. Furthermore, at times the Court
has asserted that direct protection of competitors is a valid policy goal.
In fact, the Court expressly adopted this view in both Northern Pacific
9. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984).
10. This view can be demonstrated with the simple example of a grocer who sells sugar (the
tying good) and vinegar (the tied good) in a competitive market. If the grocer requires that all sugar
customers buy a bottle of vinegar, no consumer will be injured; those who do not want vinegar will
buy sugar elsewhere. On the other hand, where the seller has monopoly power in the market for the
tying good, what some might consider adverse effects may be produced. For example, if the grocer
had a monopoly in the sugar market, he could force the sugar customers to also buy the vinegar.
3
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Railway v. United StatesII and United States v. Loew's.12 Along with this
protectionist view, the Court has adopted a broad definition of what mar-
ket conditions allow forcing: the seller may possess a patented or unique
tying product,13 or a high market share of the tying product market.
According to another view, however, the only valid reason for
prohibiting a tying arrangement is to protect consumers. The most ada-
mant proponents of this view, often referred to as the "Chicago School,"
assert that attaining economic efficiency should be the primary goal of
the antitrust laws. 4 As a result, they conclude that tying arrangements
rarely, if ever, adversely impact consumers, and to prohibit their use
would merely cause economic harm by interfering with the potential ben-
efits that the parties receive from the tie. 5 These theorists propose that
the only time that a tying arrangement should be prohibited is in the
exceedingly rare event that it could create monopoly power in the market
for the tied product. Although the Chicago School view is popular
among scholars and economists, it has never been adopted by a majority
of the Supreme Court. However, at times the Court has followed the
11. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958) (asserting that one reason ties are
prohibited is that "[ihey deny competitors free access to the market for the tied product, not be-
cause the party imposing the tying requirements has a better product or a lower price but because of
his power or leverage in another market").
12. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44-45 (1962) "[Tying arrangements] are an
object of antitrust concern for two reasons-they may force buyers into giving up the purchase of
substitutes for the tied product and they may destroy the free access of competing suppliers of the
tied product to the consuming market.") (citations omitted).
13. This requirement rests on the view that a seller may use the uniqueness of the product to
force the customer to buy the tied product. For example, in International Salt Co. v. United States,
332 U.S. 392 (1947), the case that established the framework for the modern per se analysis, the
Court held that International Salts patent's on salt-dispensing machines allowed it to force its salt
products on consumers. In reaching this conclusion the Court did not consider the company's mar-
ket share or even if competition on the merits was actually harmed. The Court has held that an
unlawful tie may be derived from the uniqueness of a good in other contexts. See, e.g., Northern
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (unique land); United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38
(1962) (copyrighted motion pictures); and Fortner Enter., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S.
495 (1969) (hereinafter Fortner I) (unique credit terms). But see William Montgomery, Note, The
Presumption of Economic Power For Patented and Copyrighted Products in Tying Arrangements, 85
COLUM. L. REv. 1140 (1985).
14. The "Chicago School," derives its name from its perceived association with scholars at the
University of Chicago, most recently Robert Bork and Richard Posner. For the roots of the Chicago
School see Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19
(1957). For more recent summaries of the Chicago School's propositions see ROBERT H. BORK,
THE ANTrrRusr PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 90-106 (1978); H. HOVENKAMP,
ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 40-49 (1985) (summarizing the Chicago School anal-
ysis); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRusT LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 171-84 (1976).
15. The Chicago School proposes that even if a monopolist forced a tie, the consumer is no
worse off than if the seller directly raised prices. As a result, the use of a tying arrangement by a
monopolist indicates that there is some added economic benefit to the parties that is received by
structuring the transaction with a tie.
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 28 [1992], Iss. 4, Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol28/iss4/10
1993] PER SE PROHIBITION OF TYING ARRANGEMENTS 821
spirit of the Chicago School and has limited antitrust protection by fo-
cusing on consumer protection. It has done this both by narrowing the
range of market conditions that allow harmful tying arrangements and
by requiring a showing that consumers are harmed by a tie before it will
be prohibited.16
Still, a more recent view of tying arrangements, first proposed by
Richard Craswell, seeks to explain why some tying arrangements might
exist where traditional concepts of forcing are not at play.17 One obvious
way that this could occur is where the tie is beneficial to both parties."8
However, Craswell also proposes that harmful ties could occur in the
absence of forcing because deficiencies in information may allow a seller
to implement a harmful tie.19 The most obvious way that this could oc-
cur is when the consumer does not know that a tie is involved at all.20
For example, the buyer might not be aware of what he is getting into due
to his own plain ignorance.2 1 Additionally, the seller may trick the buyer
into entering the agreement through fraud,22 or where the consumer
makes a large investment in the initial purchase of the tying good, a seller
may opportunistically impose the tie after the buyer has already become
"locked in."23 Further, it may be possible for "information imperfec-
tions to lead to undesirable outcomes even when buyers know beforehand
exactly what they are getting."24 This might occur where the consumer
16. See, e.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611-12 (1953)
(holding that a newspaper's tie of advertising space in a morning paper to advertising space in an
evening paper did not violate the Sherman Act because the publisher did not possess a dominant
market share in the relevant advertising market); United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enter., Inc.,
429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977) (hereinafter Fornter II) (The same unique credit terms involved in Fortner
I were insufficient to establish the power to force a harmful tie. Instead, a plaintiff must also show
that "the seller had the power to raise prices or to require purchasers to accept burdensome terms
that could not be exacted in a completely competitive market.").
17. Richard Craswell, Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets: The Consumer Protection
Issues, 62 B.U. L. REv. 661 (1982).
18. Craswell proposes that there are four basic types of benefits that can be associated with
tying. First, a tie could lead to efficiencies in production, as where it is more efficient to produce or
distribute two products as a unit. Id. at 681-82. Second, a tie could lead to efficiencies in selection,
as where a large buyer can take advantage of economies of scale and greater bargaining power. Id. at
682-84. This principle underlies many franchise contracts. Third, tying could create efficiencies in
product evaluation. Id. at 684-86. Finally, tying could create efficiencies in allocating risks. Id. at
686-87.
19. Economists have long recognized that imperfect information is one basic type of market
failure. Other types of market failures include the existence of monopolies, externalities, or public
goods. The antitrust laws have historically focused on preventing market failures that result from
monopoly. For a thorough discussion of market failures see ROBERT D. COOTER & THOMAS S.
ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMIcS 45-49 (1988).
20. Craswell, supra note 17, at 672-75.
21. Id. at 672-74.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 674-75.
24. Id. at 675-79.
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cannot estimate the cost of the various choices in the market. For exam-
ple, a consumer could suffer from the inability to estimate the long-term
price of the tie as compared to other market choices, the long-term qual-
ity of the alternative choices, or a combination of the two.25 The end
result is that the seller who imposes burdensome tying arrangements
"will not lose as much business as ideally he should."26
B. The Jefferson Parish Decision
Elements from all of these views of tying arrangements played a role
in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 27 the case that estab-
lished the framework in which Kodak was decided. Jefferson Parish in-
volved a claim by an anesthesiologist that the Jefferson Parish Hospital
District tied anesthesiological services to surgical services in violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act. 28 Despite the existence of a very critical,
Chicago School based concurrence by three Justices,29 a plurality of the
Court created a three part test for determining if a particular tie is per se
unlawful.
The first requirement is that a "substantial volume of commerce"
must be foreclosed by the tie.30 This requirement is a restatement of a
long-held rule that seeks to avoid implementing a per se rule in situations
where a small amount of commerce is involved. Without providing a
precise definition of "substantial volume," the Court held that the
amount of trade involved in the alleged tie of hospital services was suffi-
cient to warrant per se condemnation.
The second requirement is that two separate products must be in-
volved.3" The Court held that two separate products are only involved
25. For example, ifa consumer wants to buy a car he or she can probably estimate and compare
the price and quality of the various cars on the market. However, the prospective buyer may have
difficulty in estimating the number of repairs that will be needed over the life of the car, how much
this maintenance will cost in the future, or the quality of the repairs that each care dealer will be able
to deliver. Since the consumer cannot compare the real costs of any choices in the market, he or she
might agree to a tie between the car and future parts and service.
26. Craswell, supra note 17, at 678.
27. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
28. See supra note 7.
29. Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion adopted a restrictive, Chicago School analysis. She
indicated that just because a seller can force a tie does not mean harmful economic effects will result.
Instead, courts should only prohibit tying in the "rare cases where power in the market for the tying
product is used to create additional market power in the market for the tied product." Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 446 U.S. at 36-37 (footnote omitted). In short, O'Connor adopted the
Chicago School view that ties should only be prohibited where they might create monopoly power in
the tied product market.
30. Id. at 16.
31. Id. at 20.
[Vol. 28:817
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where separate economic demands exist for each product.32 For exam-
ple, separate demands existed for anesthesiological services and surgical
services because patients or surgeons often requested specific anesthesiol-
ogists for particular tasks.n
As one might expect, the third requirement is that the tying arrange-
ment must "involve the use of market power to force [consumers] to buy
services they would not otherwise purchase. '3 4 The Court recognized
that anticompetitive forcing may occur in three situations: (1) where a
seller has a patent or similar monopoly over the product; (2) where the
seller's share of the market is high; and (3) where the seller offers a
unique product that competitors are not able to offer.3 5 In short, the
Court recognized every source of market power that it had ever accepted
at any time. In applying the test to the facts of the case, however, the
court was not so liberal and stressed that the tie must be forced before
any harm could take place. Jefferson Parish Hospital had 30% of the
market share,3 6 and obviously had unique features-such as close prox-
imity to home-for at least some of its customers.3 7 However, the court
held that since 70% of the local residents used other hospitals, anticom-
petitive forcing of anesthesiological services was not taking place.3 8
Thus, the Court was willing to define the sources for market power
broadly, but by stressing the need for the seller to force the tie gave a
narrow application.39
32. Id. This element of the test actually filled a void in the law of tying, because prior to
Jefferson Parish "there was no generally accepted standard to determine whether what a seller re-
quired a purchaser to take was one or several products." Lynn H. Pasahow, Recent Developments in
Tying Law, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 379, 382 n.5 (1988). It should also be noted that this test "depends
upon economic evidence rather than the nature of the linked products. The court believed such an
economically based standard would render the rule more coherent than one based upon abstract
inquiry into whether one or two products are involved." Id. at 383.
33. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at 22-23.
34. Id. at 26.
35. Id. at 16-18.
36. Id. at 7-8.
37. Id. at 26.
38. Id. at 26-27.
39. This apparent paradoxical outcome led to divergent opinions of what the decision meant.
See, eg., Roger C. Bern, Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde: Return to Reality in
Economic Power Analysis in Tying Cases, 53 U. Mo. K.C. L. RE. 145 (1985) (indicating a return to
a broad definition of market power similar to that which existed prior to Fortner I); W. David
Slawson, A New Concept of Competition: Reanalyzing Tie-In Doctrine After Hyde, ANTITRUST
BULL. 257, 258 (1985) (promoting the theory that the "tie-in doctrine was hardly changed."); Note,
Tying Arrangement Analysis: A Continued Integration of the Rule of Reason and the Per Se Rule,
WASH. U. L.Q. (1985) (expressing the belief that the decision "narrowed the distinction between per
se and rule of reason analysis of tying arrangements"). However, in practice, Jefferson Parish has
generally "been interpreted by the lower courts as retreating to a more rigorous market power stan-
dard" because it places the focus of the analysis on the "presence or, more often, the absence of any
forcing." Pasahow, supra note 32, at 388.
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The effect of the Court's decision was two-fold. First, it made clear
that the Chicago School economic efficiency analysis was rejected and
the per se rule remained intact. Second, through the application of its
test, the Court limited the scope of antitrust protection to those situa-
tions where a consumer might be harmed by a tying arrangement. The
Court refused to recognize the effect of the tying arrangement on injured
competitors, namely Dr. Hyde, unless consumers were also harmed.
Under the facts of the case it appeared that harm and forcing were un-
likely since most residents used other hospitals.
Despite this focus on consumer protection, however, the Jefferson
Parish plurality specifically denied the possibility that other market im-
perfections-specifically third party payment for health costs and defi-
ciencies in consumer knowledge and information-could provide the
power needed to create an anticompetitive tie.4° The plurality recog-
nized that these factors might have played a role and noted that "market
imperfections" could decrease a consumer's sensitivity to "the price or
quality implications of a tying arrangement."' 41 Further, the Court rec-
ognized that competition on the merits might suffer as a result.42 With-
out providing a reasoned analysis to explain its position, however, the
Court concluded that these market failures simply "do not generate the
kind of market power that justifies condemnation of tying."' 43 In short,
the Court expressly rejected the view that unlawful tying arrangements
may result from a consumer's inadequate information. It was in this
legal landscape that the facts of Kodak developed.
III. THE KODAK DECISION
A. The Alleged Anticompetitive Behavior
Eastman Kodak Company manufactures and sells photocopiers and
micrographic equipment' and has always faced stiff competition.45
However, due to specific equipment design, a Kodak customer cannot
replace Kodak parts with a competitor's parts, so Kodak equipment
owners have always relied on Kodak to produce replacement parts. 46
40. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at 26-27.
41. Id. at 15 n.24.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 28.
44. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2077 n.1 (1992) (list-
ing the specific equipment involved in the lawsuit such as microfilmers, electronic scanners, micro-
film viewers, Computer Output Microform recorders, and Computer Assisted Retrieval systems).
45. Image Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612, 621 (9th Cir. 1990), aff'd,
112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992) (recognizing that Kodak lacked market power in its equipment markets).
46. Eastman Kodak Co., 112 S. Ct. at 2077.
[Vol. 28:817
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Kodak manufactures some parts itself and contracts out production of
other parts to independent manufacturers.4' These are and have always
been the only sources for new parts.
In addition to selling parts, Kodak has always serviced its own
equipment.48 In fact, before 1982 Kodak serviced most of its micro-
graphic and copier equipment. 9 Kodak does not sell a complete package
of equipment along with lifetime service and parts." Instead, it provides
two options: (1) contracts that include parts costs; or (2) payment on a
per-call basis.5 "
Kodak has not always been the only supplier of parts and service to
Kodak equipment owners. In the early 1980's, ISOs began offering ser-
vice, new parts, and used parts to Kodak equipment owners.5 2 The ISOs
maintained independent parts inventories, buying some parts from Ko-
dak but most parts from the independent parts manufacturers that pro-
duced new parts for Kodak. 3 The ISOs apparently filled a market niche,
because they cut into the Kodak service market.5 4 Further, some of the
ISOs offered service for lower prices than Kodak, 5 and some customers
felt the ISO service was of higher quality. 6
As might be expected, Kodak reacted to this situation. Initially, it
cut some of its prices for service. 7 However, as a second response, it
adopted a policy of eliminating the ISOs entirely by cutting off the supply
of parts to them.5" This general policy included four specific actions. 9
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 903 F.2d at 614.




54. The ISOs served a wide variety of customers, including "government agencies, banks, insur-
ance companies, industrial enterprises, and providers of specialized copy and microfilming services."
Id.
55. Id.; accord Image Technical Servs, 903 F.2d at 614 (some ISOs "offered service for as little
as half of Kodak's price.").
56. Eastman Kodak Co., 112 S. Ct. at 2077.
57. Image Technical Serv, 903 F.2d at 614.
58. Eastman Kodak Co., 112 S. Ct. at 2078. Kodak apparently made no effort to hide the
intent of its policy. An allegation from one of the ISO's customers that was received in discovery is
illustrative:
In 1987, I went to Eastman Kodak ... for an introduction of new products. At a break in
one of the meetings... I was asked why [my company] went to third-party services. I told
him that it was a matter of lower price, and better service ... than I was able to get from
Kodak. I was told [by a Kodak employee] words to the effect that it doesn't make any
difference because we're going to have third-party service by the balls because of the re-
placement parts."
App. at 538.
59. Eastman Kodak Co., 112 S. Ct. at 2077-78.
9
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First, it refused to sell the new parts that it manufactured to anyone but
buyers of Kodak equipment who used Kodak service or who serviced
their own machines. Second, it made attempts to persuade the independ-
ent manufacturers to quit selling new parts to anyone but Kodak. Third,
it pressured Kodak equipment owners and independent parts distributors
not to sell new parts to ISOs. Finally, it restricted the availability of used
machines, thus limiting the sources of used salvage parts.
The policy worked well. ISOs could not find reliable sources of new
parts, and many went out of business, while others lost profits.6 This
situation forced at least some customers to buy Kodak parts."
B. Treatment in the Lower Courts
The ISOs brought suit in the Northern District of California,62
claiming that, even though Kodak lacked market power in the equip-
ment market, its actions constituted an illegal tying arrangement in viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act and an illegal monopolization of a
relevant market in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.6 However,
the ISOs were unsuccessful; the district court granted limited discov-
ery, 4 and then granted summary judgement for Kodak.6
The ISOs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, where the decision was reversed. 6 The court of appeals,
viewing the tie as between replacement parts and service,67 concluded that
60. Id. at 2078.
61. Id.
62. Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. C-87-1686-WWS (N.D. Cal. Apr.
18, 1988), rev'd, 903 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
63. Id.; see supra note 7.
64. Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. C-87-1686-WWS, slip op. at 36B
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 1988), rey'd, 903 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992). This
discovery included one set of interrogatories, one set of requests for production of documents, and a
total of six depositions.
65. Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. C-87-1686-WWS (N.D. Cal. Apr.
18, 1988), rev'd, 903 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992). The district court based
its opinion on three grounds. First, it asserted that the ISOs failed to show that any "contract,
combination, or agreement" had taken place at all--only that a unilateral refusal to deal occurred.
Second, the district court, viewing the tie as between equipment and parts, asserted that the ISOs did
not show a tie had been implemented. Finally, the district court rejected the view that monopoliza-
tion had occurred because there was no evidence that Kodak attempted to use its power over its own
parts to gain monopoly power in any other relevant market.
66. Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1990) aff'd,
112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
67. Id. at 615 (using the Northern Pacific Railway definition of tying arrangements. "A tying
arrangement is 'an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the condition that the buyer
also purchase a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product
from any other supplier." (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958))).
[Vol. 28:817
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Kodak had two possible bases to force an anticompetitive tie on custom-
ers.6" First, Kodak had a monopoly over its own parts. Second, its cus-
tomers were "locked in" due to their large equipment investments. On
these bases it reversed the district court on both the tying and monopoli-
zation claims.
C. Issues Presented to the Supreme Court
Kodak appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court granted certio-
rari,69 apparently viewing the meager evidentiary record as an opportu-
nity for a theoretical examination of the legality of tying arrangements in
derivative aftermarkets. What started as a dispute between two parties
evolved into a battle over policy. On one side were the ISOs; on the
other were Kodak and various amici who sought to protect the interests
of manufacturers of technical equipment, including trade associations
and the United States.7 0
To settle the dispute, the Court needed to resolve two issues. First,
was it possible that Kodak, which lacked market power in its equipment
market, could impose an anticompetitive tie in the aftermarkets for that
equipment in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act? Second, could
these ties possibly result in a monopolization of a relevant market in vio-
lation of section 2 of the Sherman Act? Despite the efforts of Kodak, the
trade associations, and the United States, the Supreme Court answered
both questions in the affirmative.
D. The Supreme Court's Decision
1. The Majority's Analysis of the Tying Claim
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, addressed the tying
claim by applying the Jefferson Parish analysis,71 and he quickly disposed
of two parts of the test. First, all parties agreed that a substantial
amount of trade was involved, so that issue was immediately dismissed.72
68. Image Technical Servs., 903 F.2d at 616-18.
69. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2823 (1991).
70. This outside input was not simply motivated by an abstract interest in antitrust law-the
resolution of the issues presented in Kodak could impact other pending litigation. In fact, a total of
twelve separate lawsuits dealing with the specific issues raised in Kodak were pending in eight of the
courts of appeals. See, eg., Abcor Corp. v. AM Int'l, Inc., 916 F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1990); Service &
Training, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 737 F. Supp. 334 (D. Md. 1990); Allen-Myland, Inc. v. Interna-
tional Business Machs. Corp., 693 F. Supp. 262, (E.D. Pa. 1990); Datagate, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packad
Co., No. C 96-20018 RPA, 1988 WL 168240 (N.D. Cal. 1988), appealfiled, No. 88-15293 (9th Cir.
1988).
71. Eastman Kodak Co., 112 S. Ct. at 2079-89.
72. Id. at 2079.
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Next, he concluded that Kodak's policies could have created a tie be-
tween two distinct products-parts and service.73 Applying the Jefferson
Parish separate demand test, the majority reasoned that since parts and
service are sold separately, separate demands probably exist for each.74
The majority then moved to the remaining Jefferson Parish require-
ment-possession of market power sufficient to force the tie.'- Justice
Blackmun began this analysis by focusing on the apparent anticompeti-
tive behavior in the markets for Kodak parts and equipment.76 Kodak
could clearly control the parts it manufactured, and could probably con-
trol the distribution of parts produced by the independent manufactur-
ers. This control over the parts market might have allowed it to exclude
competitors, raise service prices, and force consumers to accept Kodak
service. Thus it appeared plausible that Kodak could force service on its
customers as a result of its control over the needed supply of new re-
placement parts.
Before finally reaching a conclusion, however, the majority ad-
dressed the economic argument offered by Kodak, the Amici, and the
dissent:" a complete lack of market power in the equipment market ab-
solutely prevents a seller from imposing anticompetitive ties in the equip-
ment's derivative aftermarkets.78 This proposal rests on the belief that
competition in the primary equipment market will necessarily spill over
into the derivative aftermarkets. Consumers will recognize and avoid an-
ticompetitive aftermarket ties by not buying equipment from Kodak in
the first place. As a result, if Kodak demanded that its customers accept
harmful aftermarket ties, they would buy equipment from other manu-
facturers, resulting in devastating losses that would make the practice
unprofitable. Obviously, if all markets behave as this theory suggests, no
seller lacking market power in an equipment market could maintain any
anticompetitive aftermarket ties over the long-term.
73. Id. at 2079-80. Like the court of appeals, the majority adopted the Northern Pacific defini-
tion of tying. See supra note 67.
74. Id. at 2078. In fact, the majority pointed out that the existence of the ISOs as a separate
provider of service depended on the existence of separate demands.
75. Id. at 2081-89.
76. Id. at 2081.
77. Id. at 2081-82.
78. Id. at 2082 ("A legal presumption against a finding of market power is warranted in this
situation, according to Kodak, because the existence of market power in the service and parts mar-
kets absent power in the equipment market 'simply makes no economic sense,' and the absence of a
legal presumption would deter procompetitive behavior.") (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
[Vol. 28:817
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The majority, however, disagreed on the ground that Kodak's the-
ory "did not explain the actual market behavior revealed in the rec-
ord."7 9 Its policies had apparently driven up the total cost of owning
Kodak equipment by increasing costs for service and parts. Under these
circumstances, according to basic principles of supply and demand, the
increased costs should have caused a decrease in Kodak equipment sales.
However, there was "no evidence" or even an "assertion that Kodak
equipment sales... dropped."8 0 As a result, the primary and derivative
markets simply were not interacting as Kodak's proffered economic the-
ory suggested they should."1
Further, the Court accepted the plausibility of specific alternative
theories that could explain this market failure: "significant information
and switching costs" might have interfered with the interaction between
the primary and derivative markets.8 2 The majority echoed Craswell's
view that a consumer might accept an anticompetitive tie due to an in-
ability to adequately estimate the prices and qualities of all available
choices.8 3 This is true because estimating the total lifecycle cost of dura-
ble equipment may be very difficult and costly. 4 Much of the informa-
tion needed to make such an analysis is expensive and even non-existent
at the time of the purchase.8 5 Furthermore, even if consumers could ac-
quire and process the information needed to compare the total life-cycle
costs of each alternative, they might not for purely legitimate reasons.8 "
There was also no absolute proof that the market would supply the
needed information. 7 Whether Kodak's competitors would provide the
necessary information was a question of fact."8 It was also uncertain
79. Eastman Kodak Co., 112 S. Ct. at 2084-85.
80. Id. at 2085.
81. Id. ("Kodak's theory does not explain the actual market behavior revealed in the record.").
82. Id. It should be noted that this assertion is in direct conflict with the Jefferson Parish view
that these types of market failures could not invoke the protection of the antitrust laws. See supra
text accompanying note 40.
83. Eastman Kodak Co., 112 S. Ct. at 2085.
84. Id.
85. Justice Blackmun noted:
During the life of a product, companies may change the service and parts prices, and de-
velop products with more advanced features, a decreased need for repair, or new warran-
ties. In addition, the information is likely to be customer-specific; lifecycle costs will vary
from customer to customer with the type of equipment, degrees of equipment use, and
costs of down-time.
Id. at 2086.
86. For example, a purchaser "may not find it cost-efficient to compile the information." Also,
"some consumers, such as the Federal Government, have purchasing systems that make it difficult to
consider the complete cost of the 'package' at the time of purchase." Id.
87. Id. at 2086-87.
88. Id. at 2086.
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whether the more "sophisticated" of Kodak's customers would remedy
the information deficiencies, especially for all Kodak equipment purchas-
ers. 9 For example, "sophisticated" purchasers might not make the in-
vestment needed to compare the lifecycle cost of Kodak's equipment to
the lifecycle cost of competing brands.90 Even if they did, Kodak still
might be able to maintain anticompetitive practices in the parts and ser-
vice aftermarkets for two reasons. 91 First, if the number of these pur-
chasers was small, Kodak might find it profitable to let them buy
elsewhere so that they could continue to exploit the less sophisticated
buyers.9 2 Also, Kodak could make special deals and keep these knowl-
edgeable customers "by varying the equipment/parts/service package,
developing different warranties, or offering price discounts on different
components. 9
3
The majority did not provide such an extended analysis of its view
that the lock-in of equipment owners might provide leverage to force
anticompetitive ties. 94 The Court noted that the heavy initial outlay for
Kodak equipment and associated materials might make it uneconomical
to change to another equipment brand.9  Further, it rejected the view
proposed by the dissent that competition in the equipment market would
prevent such forcing based on a lock-in.96 Once again, Kodak could sim-
ply discriminate and give new customers an overall competitive deal.97
Thus, the Court concluded that summary judgment should not be
granted in Kodak's favor on the section 1 tying claim.98
2. The Majority's Analysis of the Monopolization Claim
The majority then focused its attention on the ISOs' claim that Ko-
dak had monopolized the service and parts markets in violation of sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act.99 An unlawful monopoly exists where two
key elements are in place: "(1) the possession of monopoly power in the
relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that
89. Id. at 2086-87.
90. Id. at 2087 ("Given the potentially high cost of information . . . it makes little sense to
assume, in the absence of evidentiary support, that equipment-purchasing decisions are based on an
accurate assessment of the total cost .....
91. Id. at 2086-87.
92. Id. at 2086.
93. Id. at 2087.
94. Id. at 2087-88.
95. Id. at 2087.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2088-89.
99. Id. at 2089-92.
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power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of
a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident."'" 0 By ex-
tending the theories it presented in its analysis of the ISO's section 1
tying claim, the majority held that a material issue of fact existed as to
whether Kodak's tying policies also created an unlawful monopoly. 1
This holding was possible because the Court adopted a very narrow
definition of the relevant market. Despite Kodak's claim that a single
brand of a product or service cannot be a relevant market, 0 2 Justice
Blackmun asserted that the proper market definition could only be deter-
mined after a factual inquiry into the "commercial realities" faced by
current Kodak equipment owners.10 3 This meant the market analysis
only considered the competition in the parts and service markets for Ko-
dak machines. The spillover effect of competition in the primary equip-
ment markets was irrelevant.
In this narrowly defined market, the Court concluded that there was
a triable issue as to Kodak's possession of unlawful monopoly power.l°4
In analyzing the tying claim, the Court had already established that parts
and service for Kodak machines could create separate markets.10 5 Fur-
ther, it was apparent that Kodak, at least after it adopted policies of
restricting parts sales, controlled a very high share of the parts and ser-
vice markets for its equipment.'
0 6
The Court also found that there was a material issue as to whether
Kodak's use of monopoly power unjustly foreclosed competition.' 7
Since Kodak conceded that it intended to push the ISOs out of the mar-
ket, liability would turn on whether "valid business reasons" could ex-
plain its actions. 10 Kodak asserted that it had three business
justifications: (1) insuring that equipment owners received high quality
service, (2) reducing inventory costs, and (3) preventing free riding on
Kodak's capital investment.109
However, the majority concluded that material issues of fact existed
as to each asserted justification." 0 First, there was no clear evidence that
100. Id. at 2089 (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)).
101. Id. at 2090-92.
102. Id. at 2090.
103. Id. (quoting Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 572).
104. Id. at 2091.
105. Id. at 2090.
106. Id. at 2089-90.
107. Id. at 2090-92.
108. Id. at 2091 (quoting Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605
(1985) and United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945)).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2091-92.
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Kodak needed to remove all of the ISOs from the marketplace to protect
its reputation-after all, some Kodak equipment owners preferred the
ISO service. 1 Further, Kodak had not proven that its equipment cus-
tomers were incapable of distinguishing poor quality service from equip-
ment flaws. 112 Second, Kodak's assertion that it was actually attempting
to control inventory costs was doubtful because the ISOs would not nec-
essarily affect inventory costs. 113 The majority noted that inventories are
related only to the amount of parts needed, not to who makes the repairs.
In fact, the inventory costs rationale simply could not explain why Ko-
dak prevented the independent parts manufacturers from selling parts to
the ISOs because in those situations Kodak had no inventory involved.
Finally, the majority found that Kodak's alleged effort to stop free-rid-
ing, at least under the antitrust laws, was no justification at all; this type
of free-riding is simply not prohibited. 14 Thus, the Court found that
there was no business justification, and that Kodak was not entitled to
summary judgment on the section 2 claim, setting the stage for a great
deal of debate among scholars and litigation in the federal courts.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION
The key to understanding the Kodak decision is recognizing that,
despite the majority's efforts to base its analysis on rational economic
principles, follow the Jefferson Parish analysis, and keep its focus on con-
sumer protection, more than strict economic analysis is at play in the
decision. In reality, the Court takes great pains to adopt speculative eco-
nomic theories and narrow market definitions. This effort indicates that
what really drives the Court's decision is a desire to protect the ISOs in
an effort to maintain marketplace diversity. This can be more fully
demonstrated by considering two issues: (1) the extent that the Court's
111. Id. at 2091.
112. The majority asserted:
[Kodak's] quality justification appears inconsistent with its thesis that consumers are
knowledgeable enough to lifecycle price .... Kodak simultaneously claims that its custom-
ers are sophisticated enough to make complex and subtle lifecycle pricing decisions, and
yet too obtuse to distinguish which breakdowns are due to bad equipment and which are
due to bad service.
Id.
113. Id. at 2091-92.
114. Instead, the Court asserted that free-riding on another business' capital investment is only
disallowed where a prohibition is needed to "induce competent and aggressive retailers to make the
kind of investment of capital and labor necessary to distribute the product." Id. at 2092 n.33. Thus,
for this prohibition to apply the ISOs would have to be relying on Kodak's investment in the service
market. However, the facts do not suggest that the ISOs were, and Kodak did not suggest it, either.
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application of its economic theories makes sense; and (2) the extent that
policy considerations might be at play in the decision.
A. An Economic Analysis
The key to the Court's economic analysis in Kodak is its proposition
that information and switching costs could have kept the primary and
derivative markets from operating as Kodak's theory predicted. As the
Kodak dissent' 15 and lower court decisions have recognized,1 16 competi-
tion in a primary market impacts associated derivative aftermarkets. Ra-
tional consumers will, where it is feasible, consider the total cost of a
good when making a buying decision. Accordingly, where consumers
can accurately estimate the total lifecycle cost of a product, the seller will
be forced to charge competitive prices for any tied derivative products,
regardless of whether there is direct competition in the derivative
aftermarkets. Thus, the Kodak decision's reasoning either rests solely on
the view that market failures were interfering with this predicted interre-
lationship between the primary and derivative markets, or it is based on
some policy rationale other than consumer protection. As a result, the
reasonableness of the Kodak decision depends upon the validity of these
theories and their application in the tying and monopolization claims.
1. The Tying Claim
a. Information Costs Theories and the Jefferson Parish
Framework
In one sense, Kodak brings the law of tying arrangements a step
closer to reality because much of its economic analysis rests on a recogni-
tion that information costs can affect market behavior in ways that
should be considered in analyzing tying arrangements. It is simply un-
tenable to presume that a consumer will make a rational buying decision,
thus avoiding all anticompetitive ties, when the information needed to
make comparisons between the market choices is unavailable. As Justice
Blackmun noted, this problem may be pervasive when the information
115. Id. at 2099-2100.
116. See, eg., Parts and Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1988)
(Posner, J., dissenting) (asserting that a seller who lacks power in an equipment market could not
successfully maintain a harmful tie for the equipment's parts); Grappone Inc. v. Subaru of New
England, Inc., 858 F.2d 792, 798 (1st Cir. 1988) (asserting that a car manufacturer could not tie car
parts to car sales where car dealers could easily sell other car brands). Cf. A. I. Root v. Computer
Dynamics, Inc., 806 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1986) (defining the relevant market as small business com-
puters-not a single brand of computer-for purposes of analyzing the effect of a tie between the
single brand of computer and a DOS system).
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needed for accurate lifecycle pricing is impossible or costly to obtain and
may not be supplied by the marketplace." 7 Further, despite the dissent's
implications to the contrary,11 a rational consumer might view the cost
of obtaining the needed information as outweighing the potential bene-
fits. The end result is that, where information is scarce and expensive,
long-term and even permanent market distortions could occur when di-
rect competition in an aftermarket is destroyed by a tying arrangement.
It is equally clear, however, that information costs and deficiencies
could not result in a seller forcing a tie onto consumers, at least not in the
Jefferson Parish sense of the word. In fact, even Richard Craswell was
not concerned that forcing was the problem." 9 Instead, the potential
source of market failure is the consumer's inability to accurately compare
the choices that are freely available in the marketplace.' 20  Another
scholar describes this potential cost-hiding effect of tying arrangements
as "eliminating, blurring, or confusing competition on the merits. 1' 21
This muddling effect could operate in two specific ways, neither of which
involves forcing. Initially, the lack of information causes the consumer
to accept a harmful tie. Then, since the consumer only receives the tied
good from one source, there is no basis upon which to evaluate its rela-
tive price and quality once it is received. The result could be that compe-
tition on the merits decreases, and the seller can charge more, provide
less, or some combination thereof.
However, because the Kodak Court analyzes the case within the Jef-
ferson Parish framework, it does not directly recognize that this mud-
dling effect of informational deficiencies is the primary source of market
failure. Instead, it asserts that the potential basis for invoking antitrust
protection is Kodak's ability to force service due to its control over the
supply of its own parts. Under the majority's forcing analysis, however,
the consumer's informational deficiencies are still the real reason that the
anticompetitive ties are possible. Even if Kodak could force ties due to
its control over parts, rational consumers would avoid any aftermarket
ties by not buying Kodak equipment if they possessed complete, accu-
rate, and reliable information. Thus, the source of any potential harm
117. See supra text accompanying notes 84-90.
118. Eastman Kodak Co., 112 S. Ct. at 2097 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that "we have
never before premised the application of antitrust doctrine on the lowest common denominator of
consumer").
119. Craswell, supra note 17, at 663 (stating clearly that the purpose of his analysis was to depart
"from the traditional tie-in literature by analyzing the conditions under which tie-ins are likely to be
imposed by sellers without any monopoly power") (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 675-76.
121. See Slawson, supra note 39, at 268.
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must be a breakdown in the interaction between the primary and deriva-
tive markets, and the Court's focus on the ability to force anticompetitive
ties is misplaced.
This quirk in the majority's analysis is not simply a matter of seman-
tics; it leads to ambiguities and analytical sidestepping. First, the Court's
use of a forcing test creates a legal precedent that could lead to inconsis-
tent outcomes in very similar cases. Strictly following the Jefferson Par-
ish requirements, the majority proposes that the per se rule may be
invoked only where there is a forced tie between two aftermarket prod-
ucts and information costs prevent the consumer from recognizing and
avoiding the anticompetitive tie. Furthermore, it is not clear that the
Court intends to provide any protection where a seller has directly imple-
mented a tie based on the same information deficiencies.1 22 Thus, if Ko-
dak had directly tied its equipment sales to all maintenance costs
(including parts and service) and then charged supracompetitive prices
for the maintenance costs, the practices would be allowed. This would be
true even though the problems of inadequate information-and the po-
tential ability to charge supracompetitive prices-are identical in both
situations; all that is different is the formulation of the problem.123 Even
more importantly, in both situations the real source of market failure is
not based on forcing, but on the breakdown between the primary and
derivative markets caused by muddling of competition on the merits.124
122. In a footnote the majority seems to indicate that a consumer's lack of information, standing
alone, would not be enough to invoke antitrust protection. Justice Blackmun asserts that:
Whether a tie between parts and service should be treated identically to a tie between
equipment and service, as the dissent and Kodak argue, depends on whether the equipment
market prevents the exertion of market power in the parts market. Far from being "anom-
alous," requiring Kodak to provide evidence on this factual question is completely consis-
tent with our prior precedent.
Eastman Kodak Co., 112 S. Ct. at 2087 n.24. This statement indicates that the majority would not
prohibit a direct tie in two ways. First, Justice Blackmun does not directly contradict the dissent's
assertion that a direct tie would be allowed. Second, the statement focuses on the "exertion of
power," which implies that forcing is absolutely required.
123. The Kodak dissent correctly recognized that the economic effect of the alleged tie, between
parts and service, was the same as if the tie was between equipment and parts. After all, the real
effect of the restrictive parts policies is to create a "bundling of equipment on the one hand, with
parts and service on the other." Id. at 2095. Thus, the dissent reasoned that the economic analysis
of the tie should be no different than if the tie was directly between equipment and parts, and con-
cluded that the absence of forcing of equipment meant that the tie was harmless. Id. at 2095-96. In
particular, the dissent pointed out that:
It is quite simply anomalous that a manufacturer functioning in a competitive equipment
market should be exempt from the per se rule when it bundles equipment with parts and
service, but not when it bundles parts with service. This vast difference in treatment of
what will ordinarily be economically similar phenomena is alone enough to call today's
decision into question.
Id. at 2096.
124. The Court could have asserted that the real tie was between equipment and service that
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The obvious answer is that if information costs are to be recognized
as a basis for invoking section 1, their form is irrelevant. Instead, courts
should directly recognize the real economic effect of tying in the presence
of significant information costs and allow claims even in the absence of
forcing. It is likely that judicial attempts to resolve this problem will be
the legacy of the Kodak decision.
Additionally, slipping into the Jefferson Parish analysis creates a
precedent that potentially allows the imposition of a per se prohibition
based on the existence of information costs; however, the Court com-
pletely fails to discuss whether such a per se rule is appropriate. Even if
the per se rule is proper where a seller forces the tie-which in and of
itself has been vigorously questioned' 25-there is no reason to assume
that a similar rule is appropriate where the real source of the ability to
implement the tie is inadequate information. The existence of informa-
tion deficiencies coupled with a tying arrangement is not necessarily
harmful. For example, such a tie could actually help consumers cope
with inadequate information by aiding in product selection. 126 Craswell
proposed several alternative, non-antitrust remedies that might correct
the effects of ties resulting from inadequate information. t2 7 However,
should the Court decide to remedy these market failures by applying the
antitrust laws, the analysis might best proceed under a rule of reason.1 28
At the very least, in this context courts should give the per se test a very
required new parts. Under this view, the limitation of new parts availability would really be a mech-
anism by which the tie was implemented. Admittedly, this view of the tie does not fit the description
of a typical tying arrangement. Instead, it would amount to a uniform refusal to deal creating a
market environment where consumers would be forced to buy parts and service from the same
source that supplied the equipment. However, the Court has recognized that the legality of a partic-
ular type of behavior "depends on its competitive consequences, not on whether it can be labelled
'tying'." Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 21 n.34 (1984).
125. See supra text accompanying note 14.
126. A prime example of this healthy use of tying arrangements is a franchise agreement where
the franchisee agrees to purchase supplies from the franchisor, or at least as selected by the
franchisor.
127. On this point Richard Craswell noted that "[l]imiting the choice to complete laissez-faire or
total prohibition, however, ignores a large set of alternative remedies. This ignorance may be under-
standable, for under antitrust law these are the only choices available. Tie-ins must be exonerated
completely or subjected to treble damage sanctions which effectively prohibit their further use."
Craswell, supra note 17, at 688.
128. Such a rule could take several factors into consideration. First, courts should focus on
whether the existence of information deficiencies actually created anticompetitive conditions-im-
perfect information is commonplace and does not always lead to harmful conditions. Second, courts
should consider whether the seller made efforts to inform the consumer of the existence and costs of
the tie. Finally, courts should consider whether the tie is really beneficial-a tie should not be
prohibited where the parties agreed to it based on a perceived mutual benefit. For more information
on considerations concerning possible remedies see Craswell, supra note 17, at 687-700.
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narrow application, limiting it to situations where a factual inquiry
shows that a tie is creating harm.
b. Consumers' Switching Costs as a Basis For an
Aftermarket Tie
The majority's claim that a lock-in of equipment owners could lead
to an anticompetitive aftermarket tie is even more problematic. Specifi-
cally, the Court's conception of the effect of a lock-in on equipment own-
ers fails to explain why a breakdown between the primary and derivative
markets would occur, which is what the theory is designed to accom-
plish.' 29 The presence of switching costs is simply not related to a new
purchaser's ability to recognize and avoid harmful ties. If a potential
equipment purchaser could detect anticompetitive aftermarket ties, the
switching costs of current Kodak equipment owners would in no way
encourage acceptance of this new tying arrangement. All that the lock-in
theory does explain is why Kodak could implement a harmful tying ar-
rangement on existing equipment owners. If it would be more costly to
buy new equipment than to accept an unfavorable deal on parts and ser-
vice, a rational consumer would continue to accept the tie. However,
even this abuse of market power would correct itself as the equipment
owners phased out their Kodak equipment.
Further, under the specific facts of Kodak, it is unlikely that, as the
majority claimed, 130 Kodak could impose anticompetitive ties on all
equipment owners and simultaneously avoid a decrease in new equip-
ment sales by giving new equipment buyers special treatment. First, as
the majority forcefully noted, the presence of information deficiencies
would make it difficult or impossible to measure cost of accepting the
tie. "' Thus, it would be very difficult to properly compensate a new
purchaser for accepting future service and parts on unknown anticompe-
titive terms. Additionally, even if information costs played no role, Ko-
dak's sales practices do not support the majority's proposition that
Kodak might have catered to wary equipment customers by altering the
package price of "equipment/parts/service."' 32 Kodak only offers one-
129. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2085 (1992).
130. See supra text accompanying note 93.
131. The mere assertion that Kodak would even need to take action to prevent new customers
from fleeing is fundamentally inconsistent with the proposal that information costs would make it
difficult, if not impossible, to perceive the existence of a harmful tie. Thus, the Court's information
costs theory and lock-in theory are virtually mutually exclusive.
132. See supra text accompanying note 93. Kodak's policy of treating equipment purchasers
differently is representative of virtually any seller of any high-tech equipment. To limit competitors
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year service contracts or charges on a per-call basis.13 3 Within a year's
time all Kodak equipment owners could be subjected to a change in
prices or service. Some might just be allowed to wait longer-until their
one-year service contracts run-before harsher policies could be
implemented.
However, even though switching costs, standing alone, could not
have allowed Kodak to impose anticompetitive ties on a long-term basis,
they could facilitate Kodak's exploitation of consumers' information
costs. First, Kodak's ability to rely on income from locked-in equipment
owners would decrease the business risk in initially adopting the restric-
tive parts policies. Second, to the extent that locked-in customers actu-
ally could determine the complete lifecycle costs of owning Kodak
equipment, they would have less incentive to do so. After all, once
locked-in, even consumers that suspect they are being harmed by a tie
might not make a thorough investigation if they knew that the cost of
switching brands would be prohibitive. Thus, the Court's focus on
switching costs as an independent basis for long-term anticompetitive be-
havior appears flawed.
2. The Monopolization Claim
If long-term consumer protection is the Court's goal, the resolution
of the monopolization claim is also troublesome. Particularly, the major-
ity's assertion that the relevant market definition could be limited to the
choices available to current equipment owners is flawed. In order for this
definition to be proper, competition in the primary market could not spill
over into the derivative aftermarkets. As a result, Kodak's ability to act
as a monopolist in the aftermarkets for its own equipment depends on
whether the alleged market imperfections-information deficiencies and
switching costs-could isolate the aftermarkets from the inter-brand
equipment competition to the extent that monopolization would occur.
However, these market imperfections could not lead to a long-term mo-
nopolization of the aftermarkets.1 34
First, information deficiencies could never lead to the creation of a
monopoly in a derivative aftermarket. A monopolist possesses the ability
from engaging in this discrimination would prohibit sellers from adapting to the specific needs of
their customers, an activity that is essential to free trade.
133. See supra note 51.
134. Accord Virtual Maintenance, Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc. 957 F.2d 1318, 1328 (6th Cir.
1992) ("Defining the market by customer demand after the customer has chosen a single supplier
fails to take into account that the supplier . . . must compete with other similar suppliers to be
designated the sole source of in the first place.").
[Vol. 28:817
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to charge supra-competitive prices because he controls the choices that
are available to the consumer. In fact, the "relevant market" is merely
the area of commerce in which a monopolist, due to his high market
share, controls the choices available to consumers to fill a given need.
131
However, as already explained,13 6 information deficiencies do not lead to
the forcing of choices. Instead, they muddle the relative costs and bene-
fits of the choices that clearly are available.
The importance of this distinction becomes clear when the differing
economic effects of each scenario are considered. If Kodak were a mo-
nopolist it would seek to decrease supply and charge supracompetitive
rates. 3 7 Similarly, if information costs were truly the source of the prob-
lem, Kodak might still maintain supracompetitive rates as a long-term
policy. However, any potential anticompetitive behavior would be lim-
ited by the need to attract new equipment customers. Kodak would seek
to set the price-quality mix at a level just harmful enough so as to evade
detection by potential and existing equipment owners. Thus, Kodak's
so-called monopoly profits would only be as good as the muddling of
competition would allow. In short, although Kodak's actions could be
improper, no monopoly would be present.
Additionally, switching costs could not lead to the creation of profit-
able, long-term monopolistic behavior in the aftermarkets. First, absent
either information costs or some principled basis for discriminating be-
tween current equipment owners and new equipment purchasers-which
was almost surely not present under the facts of Kodak-acting as a mo-
nopolist would lead to drastic decreases in new equipment sales. The lost
sales of new equipment would certainly prove unprofitable over the long-
term and would probably be unprofitable even in the short-term. Second,
even if the monopolistic behavior could be focused at the locked-in own-
ers, the practice would be temporary-as equipment would wear out and
is replaced, the monopoly would crumble. 38 Thus, applying section 2 of
the Sherman Act would be both unnecessary and inconsistent with the
135. See United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956) ("where there
are market alternatives that buyers may readily use for their purposes, illegal monopoly does not
exist"). See also WILLIAM C. HOLMES, 1992 ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK 277 (1992).
136. See supra text accompanying note 119.
137. Cf WALDMAN, supra note 1, at 38 ("To an economist, monopoly power is the ability to
control price. In a technical sense this control should be complete, meaning that the monopolist
should control 100 percent of the market. In a realistic, or legal, sense this condition is rarely met,
unless a market is defined very narrowly.").
138. It is also very likely that this behavior would prove unprofitable over the long-term. First,
the consumers who were mistreated by Kodak would likely never buy from them again. Addition-
ally, subjecting consumers to monopolistic conditions does little to promote good will with the
public.
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historical purposes of the Act. 139
C. A Shift In Policy?
These so-called "flaws" in the majority's analysis are better viewed
as symptoms of a policy-driven decision by the Court. Certainly, the
majority is not using theories that it feels are completely invalid just to
reach a policy goal. However, the Kodak Court was very willing to ac-
cept speculative theories and narrow market definitions, and it is likely
that this was done to implement a policy of maintaining marketplace
diversity by protecting competitors. Specifically, the Court seeks to
shield small providers of service in the aftermarkets for high-technology
equipment. Justice Blackmun expressly indicates that this is one consid-
eration and notes that Kodak's proposed legal rules are unacceptable,
not because they are unsound from an economic efficiency standpoint,
but because they would "exempt a vast and growing sector of the econ-
omy from antitrust laws."' " Clearly, the majority intends to make it
more difficult for manufacturers to tie parts and service and drive com-
peting service firms out of business. It is likely they will be successful
At the very least, the Court's recognition of the effect of information and
switching costs, along with the holding that a single-brand aftermarket
can be a relevant market, will allow more plaintiffs to avoid summary
judgement and force defendants into trial. In this way the Court affords
antitrust protection to the "vast and growing sector of the economy" that
is not a party to the Kodak suit.
This leads to the question of how far the Court intends to extend
antitrust protection to competitors. In particular, does the Court seek a
return to the Northern Pacific 14 ' and Loew's 42 views that competitor
protection, standing alone, is a valid basis for invoking the protection of
the antitrust laws? If the Kodak decision is any indication, the focus on
139. Justice Scalia, in his dissent, vehemently attacked this application of section 2 and claimed
that:
By permitting antitrust plaintiffs to invoke § 2 simply upon the unexceptional demonstra-
tion that a manufacturer controls the supplies of its single-branded merchandise, the Court
transforms § 2 from a specialized mechanism for responding to extraordinary agglomera-
tions (or threatened agglomerations) of economic power to an all-purpose remedy against
run-of-the-mill business torts.
In my view, if the interbrand market is vibrant, it is simply not necessary to enlist § 2's
machinery to police a seller's intrabrand restraints.
Eastman Kodak Co., 112 S. Ct. at 2101 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 2089 n.29.
141. See supra note 11.
142. See supra note 12.
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forcing and consumer protection remains intact. After all, Justice Black-
mun mechanically applied Jefferson Parish's three-part test. This appli-
cation amounted to a stamp of approval on Jefferson Parish by a majority
of the Court. Further, even if the Court was concerned with protecting
competitors, it based its decision upon economic theories that provided a
consumer protection rationale for what it was doing. Thus, the Court
apparently intends to adhere to Jefferson Parish, but it is willing to be-
come creative where it appears that a large number of competitors are
being harmed by a particular type of tying arrangement.
Since it is clear that the Court does not seek to establish an express
policy of competitor protection, the truly difficult problem posed by Ko-
dak is determining when the unspoken policy of competitor protection
applies. In other words, now that the Supreme Court has become crea-
tive, when should the lower courts follow suit?
The answer lies in a careful consideration of Jefferson Parish and
Kodak. In a very fundamental way, the Court's adherence to Jefferson
Parish in Kodak indicates that the opinions share the same goal-both
are ultimately aimed at consumer protection. The Jefferson Parish Court
was unwilling to adopt speculative theories and narrow market defini-
tions, but the number of competitors and consumers affected was small.
The Kodak Court, however, did not want to impose legal rules allowing
complete removal of competition from aftermarkets based on manufac-
turer's inherent control over needed materials. Economic theory clearly
explains why competition in a primary market would maintain a theoret-
ical efficiency in an aftermarket. However, the elimination of such a
great volume of diversity in the marketplace causes economic harms that
are not accounted for by strictly applied, economic efficiency-oriented
theories. 143
Thus, Kodak's stricter tests should only be applied where two condi-
tions are met: (1) it is clear that the parties to the tie did not attain real
benefits from the tie; and (2) allowing the particular tie would decrease
the diversity in the marketplace to a degree that consumers would be
harmed. If Kodak is applied in this narrow manner the fact that its eco-
nomic theories are flawed becomes significantly less troubling. Further-
more, if applied in this manner, Kodak would not only be consistent
with the policy underlying Jefferson Parish but also with the policy un-
derlying the whole history of the law of tying arrangements. 1"
143. Accord Slawson, supra note 39, at 264-66.
144. Cf. Kramer supra note 1, at 1066-67. At least one scholar would probably agree and
asserts:
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V. CONCLUSION
The Kodak decision will certainly create a great deal of controversy
and spark new debate among legal and economic thinkers. Many will
fundamentally disagree, as did the dissent, that information and switch-
ing costs should ever provide a basis for invoking the protection of the
antitrust laws. Further, even those who agree with the Court's underly-
ing theories, at least upon careful consideration, should note that Kodak
may become very problematic precedent. Application of the case is
likely to be inconsistent and, if applied broadly, could ultimately injure
competition by penalizing procompetitive ties. Further, the opinion's ac-
ceptance of speculative theories to reach a policy goal-which in and of
itself is not clearly defined-is also troubling.
However, the potential harm that the opinion could cause is not
inevitable. Due to the fact-specific nature of the case, lower courts could
easily limit the opinion's application to the situations where it appears
that actual market failures are promoting activities that are clearly an-
ticompetitive. Further, lower courts should keep in mind that the appar-
ent policy decision made by the Court is aimed at promoting marketplace
diversity. Kodak does not assert that harm to competitors is equivalent
to an antitrust violation. In these ways, the opinion's flaws may be lim-
ited with relative ease, and it might ultimately cause much more dispute
in academic circles than actual harm in the industries of our country.
Neil D. Van Dalsem
The history of the law of tying arrangements has been one of changing tests reflecting
changing theories of legitimate application of the antitrust laws. The law has evolved
through shifting judicial attitudes, attitudes that sometimes emphasize the contribution of
tying arrangements to efficiency and other times insist that other values, such as preserva-
tion of competition, control. It cannot be denied that the Supreme Court opinions develop-
ing antitrust law have been principled; the difficulty is that two sets of principles, each at
war with the other, exist at any given moment. The law pronounced by the Court depends
on which principle reaches the result that, to the majority, seems most just, fair, reason-
able, or workable.
Kramer, supra note 1, at 1066-67.
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